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Abstract: Cognitive models of social anxiety suggest that negative mental self-imagery 
maintains social anxiety. Much research posits social anxiety is accompanied by 
increased negative self-imagery; however, little research investigates self-imagery’s 
impact beyond performance in social interaction. This study aimed to investigate the 
relationship between social anxiety and task effectiveness and efficiency using behavioral 
data and measures of neural activity (i.e., Event Related Potentials). Furthermore, 
manipulations in self-imagery were used to investigate its moderating effects. Twenty 
five individuals with high and 23 with low levels of social anxiety completed three self-
imagery manipulations and completed a Go/No-go task after each manipulation. Results 
indicated that individuals with high levels of social anxiety performed equally well as the 
individuals with low social anxiety. Importantly, those with high levels of social anxiety 
showed slower reaction times during the task and decreased efficiency of neural 
recruitment. These results support the attentional control theories assertions that social 
anxiety is often more associated with poor efficiency than it is with poor effectiveness. 
Unexpectedly, no interactions with self-imagery were observed, which may suggest that 
individuals with social anxiety show decreased efficiency, generally, when engaging in 
self-focused attention. Further research is necessary to determine the potential 
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Social anxiety disorder is one of the most common forms of psychopathology, affecting 
between 7 – 12 percent of the population a year (Kessler et al., 2005; Kessler et al., 2012). Based 
on clinical definitions (APA, 2013) and ample research (e.g., Brown, Campbell, Lehman, 
Grisham, & Mancill, 2001; Buckner, Farris, Schmidt, & Zvolensky, 2014; Caplan, 2007), this 
disorder is associated with significant impairment (e.g., avoidance, decreased social performance) 
and distress (e.g., loneliness). As a result, theoretical models have been developed to explain the 
factors that sustain this debilitating condition (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Within these perspectives, negative self-imagery is posited to play a large role in the maintenance 
of social fears. Specifically, holding a negative self-image of oneself in mind will increase 
cognitive, psychological, and behavioral symptoms of anxiety, thus leading to an even more 
skewed mental representation of the self. This cycle likely contributes to the maintenance of 
social anxiety symptomology (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). However, 
research evaluating the role of self-imagery in social anxiety has, largely, been limited to the 
effects on social performance measures (self-report and observer report of performance during 
social situations). The purpose of this study is to investigate how self-imagery influences 
cognitive processing as well as corresponding neural activation.  
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Cognitive models of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
suggest that when entering a social situation, an individual with social anxiety will prioritize 
external and internal threat related stimuli (e.g., Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, 
& Williams, 2003). This leads to attentional biases towards both external information related to 
the threat, as well as a self-focus bias. This bias is shown through anxiety related thoughts, 
physiology, and behavior which are related to the threat (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Specific to self-focused attention, research indicates that individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety engage in more negative self-imagery in relation to social situations (e.g., 
Blasi, Cavani, Pavia, Baido, Grutta & Schimmenti, 2015; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, 
& Moscovitch, 2011) and that those negative self-images lead to enhanced anxiety (worry), 
poorer performance, and further self-focused attention (e.g., Brozovich & Heimberg, 2013; 
Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003). For example, Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews, and Williams (2003) used a variation of the Hackman (1998) self-imagery 
manipulation to induce self-focused attention, in which participants recalled recent positive and 
negative social situations and were told to imagine what they looked like in those situations while 
having a conversation with another participant. Results found that individuals with social anxiety 
who held a negative self-image in mind had greater anxiety, more processing of physiological 
symptoms, and performed worse in the conversation, compared to when they held a neutral self-
image in their head. Thus, this style of self-focused attention typically increases the fear of the 
threat of negative evaluation and current anxiety symptomology (e.g., Makkar & Grisham, 2011; 
Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; see Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006, for a review). 
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007) proposed a model that explains how 
worry and negative self-focused attention affect individuals with anxiety and may lead to poorer 
social and task performance as well as exasperated anxiety. Because cognitive resources have a 
limited capacity (Baddeley, 2003, 2012; Moran, 2016), the attentional control theory suggests that 
enhanced self-focused attention (i.e., enhanced processing of threat related information) and 
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anxiety both take up a portion of cognitive resources, thus limiting the amount of resources 
allocated to the task at hand (Eysenck et al., 2007). Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed that worry 
(e.g., worrying about one’s self-image) is related to enhanced internal threat focus, thus 
individuals with social anxiety also will engage in enhanced threat focus which takes up 
attentional resources. Research on social anxiety, based on this framework, shows that these 
individuals often display deficits in tasks that involve the executive control function of working 
memory, indicating that anxiety and self-focused attention lead to poor task performance (e.g., 
Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker & Eysenck, 2009).  
In addition, Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed that task performance involves two 
components: effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness is how well one completes the task, 
frequently assessed using error rates. Efficiency is the amount of effort put forth to complete the 
task, such as length of time in selecting a correct response and how much neural activity is used 
to complete the task correctly. It is argued that when effectiveness deficits are not seen, it is 
possible that deficits in efficiency may occur (Eysenck et al., 2007). Research in this area has 
focused primarily on inhibition, which is one executive control function that seems to be 
influenced by anxiety. Inhibition involves maintaining attention towards the task at hand, 
ignoring irrelevant information, controlling responses to task irrelevant behavior, and only 
responding to task relevant stimuli (Miyake et al., 2000). Inhibition deficits have been found in 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety in both effectiveness, and more so, in efficiency 
(Grillon et al., 2016; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009).  
Generally, research finds that individuals with anxiety can perform as well as other 
individuals leading to normal effectiveness, but use more effort to complete the task leading to 
poor efficiency (Derakshan et al., 2009; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009). For example, the 
Go/No-go task is a measure of inhibition, in which individuals are shown a series of stimuli and 
told to respond by pressing a button to certain stimuli and inhibiting a response to other stimuli. 
The stimuli that require an inhibition response are less frequent, leading the participant to begin 
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responding with a prepotent response to the presented stimuli. When an infrequent, to-be-
inhibited stimulus appears, it requires the inhibition of the prepotent response. This is used as the 
measure of inhibition.  A meta-analysis by Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararjah, and 
Schachar (2014) found that anxiety disorders consistently showed deficits in the ability to inhibit 
the prepotent response. These findings, in addition to other studies (e.g., Grillon, Robinson, 
Krimsky, O’Connell, Alvarez, & Ernst, 2016), suggest that anxiety impairs inhibition 
performance (i.e., increased error rates). However, other studies have failed to find performance 
deficits, although individuals with anxiety still displayed efficiency deficits (i.e., longer latency to 
respond, more neural activity; Righi et al., 2009). With somewhat conflicting results, it is 
important to examine and compare both behavioral and psychophysiological measures to truly 
understand the impact that anxiety has on cognitive performance.  
Psychophysiological activity offers a unique perspective towards the investigation of 
effectiveness and efficiency, as researchers are able to collect neural activity (efficiency) along 
with behavioral responses (effectiveness) within the same task. Collecting neural activity is useful 
as it provides a direct measure of the effort it takes for an individual to respond (or inhibit) to a 
task. Research using electroencephalography suggests that event-related potentials (ERP’s; neural 
activity directly related to a stimulus or response) can be used to measure the effort an individual 
puts towards a task and have been shown to be sensitive to, and influenced by, different levels of 
trait anxiety (e.g., Meyer, Hajcak, Torpey-Newman, Kujawa, & Klein, 2015; Owens, Derakshan, 
& Richards, 2015; Savostyanov, Tsai, Liou, Levin, Lee, Vurganov, & Knyazev, 2009) and 
specifically social anxiety (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; Judah et al., 2013; Moser, 
Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2008; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009). For example, 
Sehlmeyer et al., (2010) found that the N2 (an ERP component associated with attentional 
resources allocated to the task at hand; Luck, 2014; Jodo & Kayama, 1992) and the P3 (an ERP 
component associated with resource allocation used in processing the stimulus; Isreal, Chesney, 
Wickens, & Donchin, 1980; Luck, 2012, 2014) are larger for individuals with anxiety compared 
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to individuals without anxiety when attempting to inhibit a prepotent response. These results 
support additional findings that individuals with trait anxiety recruit more neural resources when 
attempting to inhibit responses (Henderson, 2010; Hum, Manassis, & Lewis, 2013; Judah et al., 
2013; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015; Righi, 
Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009; Wauthia & Rossignol, 2016; Wauthia & Rossignol, 2016).  
According to the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) and corresponding 
research (e.g., Judah et al., 2013; Moser et al., 2008; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009), 
individuals with anxiety will generally recruit more neural resources to complete a task; however, 
some findings show decreased neural activity. Because individuals with anxiety preferentially 
allocate neural resources to threatening information, they have less resources to allocate to the 
task at hand. For example, Judah et al. (2013) had participants complete an inhibition task while 
manipulating self-focused attention. The results showed that individuals with social anxiety 
demonstrated overall greater effort for inhibition trials (i.e., longer latencies, increased neural 
activity); however, on self-focus trials, they showed decreased neural activity. This effect was not 
found for individuals low in social anxiety. Therefore, these results support the attentional control 
theory’s proposal that anxiety related cognitive activity leads to decreased neural resources to 
other tasks (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck et al., 2007). This implies that tasks involving 
threatening information or stimuli will produce decreased neural activity, whereas tasks that do 
not involve threat will produce increased neural activity. 
In summary, the current state of research indicates that social anxiety is associated with 
skewed and disproportionate levels of negative self-imagery (e.g., Blasi, Cavani, Pavia, Baido, 
Grutta & Schimmenti, 2015; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011). 
Models of social anxiety suggest that negative self-imagery is a maintenance factor for social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The attentional control theory 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) proposes that impairments in social anxiety are present because working 
memory has a limited capacity and that those with social anxiety process and focus on threat 
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related information (internal, external) at a higher rate than individuals without social anxiety, 
which leads to diminished cognitive resources allocated to tasks related to inhibition. Moreover, 
diminished cognitive resources appears to present itself in psychophysiological studies of neural 
activity, such that those with social anxiety exhibit enhanced neural recruitment (poor efficiency) 
to compensate for the diminished resources due to anxiety, although display decreased neural 
recruitment when attention is focused on threat related information.   
The current study used the Go/No-go task while collecting ERP’s to investigate how 
manipulations of negative self-imagery affect the effectiveness and efficiency of inhibition. In 
line with the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), differences in effectiveness 
between high and low socially anxious individuals were not expected; however, it is hypothesized 
that individuals with high social anxiety would show hindered efficiency in the Go/No-go task 
shown by 1) longer inhibition response latencies to the to-be-inhibited stimuli, 2) enhanced levels 
of neural activity (N2, P3) to inhibit a response. In addition, when processing negative self-
imagery, individuals with social anxiety would display overall decreases in neural activity to the 
task compared to the neutral and positive self-images as well as compared to the individuals with 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Social Anxiety 
 Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is one of the most common anxiety disorders and affects 
between 7 - 12% of the population each year (Kessler et al., 2005; Kessler et al., 2012). Socially 
anxious individuals exhibit persistent and debilitating fear and anxiety in social situations in 
which they face the possibility of negative evaluation (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013). A core feature of SAD is a strong desire to be socially liked and accepted, but a 
debilitating insecurity in his or her abilities to achieve that goal (Clark & Wells, 1995). Social 
anxiety is a common human experience, whereas SAD is when the anxiety and fear become 
debilitating, interfering, and impairing. A distinction is necessary; however, social anxiety is 
thought to lay on a continuum, in which the only difference between subclinical social anxiety 
and SAD is the level of impairment (Ruscio, 2010; Ruscio, Haslam, & Suscio, 2006). A 
taxometric analysis by Ruscio (2010) attempting to find an underlying taxa (or category) that 
would distinguish SAD from normal social anxiety found no taxa. This finding, along with 
findings that individuals with SAD and subclinical social anxiety have the same type of 
symptomology (Purdon, Antony, Monteiro, & Swinson, 2001) and attentional and processing 
biases (Bradley, Mogg, Millar & Bonham-Carter, 1997; Clark, & McManus, 2002; Öhman, 
1986), suggests that social anxiety is a dimensional construct.  
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Social anxiety has negative outcomes (APA, 2013), including higher levels of cigarette 
use and nicotine dependency (Buckner, Farris, Schmidt, & Zvolen-sky, 2014; Lopes et al., 2002), 
loneliness (Caplan, 2007; Mahon, Yarcheski, Yarcheski, Cannella, & Hanks, 2006), and 
decreased occupational functioning and satisfaction (APA, 2000). In addition, those with SAD 
experience high rates of depressive symptoms (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 
2001; Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). Because social anxiety is so 
highly prevalent and has many negative outcomes and consequences, it is important to understand 
and investigate causal and maintenance factors. Therefore, cognitive models of social anxiety will 
be discussed.  
Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety 
 Cognitive models of SAD (Clark & McManus, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, 
Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Peschard & Philippot, 2015; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have become 
very popular modalities to conceptualize social anxiety over the past two decades. Similar to 
other cognitive models in psychology, these models suggest that cognitive processes and 
information processing (attention, perception, and interpretation) contribute to the development 
and maintenance of SAD symptomology. According to these frameworks, individuals with SAD 
typically process information, pay attention to information, and form belief systems that 
contribute to the cyclical nature of social anxiety. For example, an individual with social anxiety 
may believe that he or she is boring, unable to hold a conversation, or lacks socially acceptable 
and redeeming qualities. During social situations, that individual will perceive internal and 
external information in such a way that will reinforce his/her negative beliefs, thus contributing to 
the disorder (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
 The Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) models are similar in many 
ways. They both suggest that a distorted self-representation or self-image is key to the 
development of anxious symptomology during social situations. Upon entering a social situation 
in which negative social evaluation is possible, individuals with SAD will create a self-image of 
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what they think they look like in the eyes of others (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). These self-images are created and influenced by the perception of current behavioral, 
cognitive, and physical symptoms along with the likely already-distorted self-image and 
autobiographical memory the individual with social anxiety holds of him/herself. For example, an 
individual with social anxiety will preferentially allocate attentional resources to responses to 
anxiety (anxious symptomology; e.g., sweating, blushing, squirming around, and negative self-
talk), which will influence the self-image they hold, such that if the individual with social anxiety 
perceives that he/she is sweating more, then he will picture himself as sweating more (Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Because this new self-image (i.e., overly perspiring) is perceived as less desirable, 
it leads to further anxious symptomology and attention is allocated towards it. This process has 
been termed emotional reasoning (Burns, 1980), ex-consequentia reasoning (Arntz, Rauner, & 
van den hout, 1995) and processing of felt sense (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), in which one’s 
feelings or thoughts are perceived to be true and apparent to others. For example, an individual 
with social anxiety may mistake feeling judged or humiliated without actually being judged or 
humiliated. This same cyclical pattern is shown for both cognitive and symptoms of anxiety 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
 The largest difference between Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
models is where the focus of the allocation of attentional resources rests. Whereas Clark and 
Wells (1995) argue that there is a self-focused preferential allocation of attention (i.e., anxious 
thoughts, negative self-talk, worry, physiological symptoms of anxiety, behavioral symptoms of 
anxiety), Rapee and Heimberg (1997) posit that in addition to the self-focused attention, there 
also is preferential allocation to external threatening cues that threaten one’s self-representation. 
For example, an individual with social anxiety in a social situation would devote their cognitive 
resources to anxious thoughts and symptomology based on threatening stimuli in the environment 
that indicate the realization of the feared outcome. Regardless of where the individual is 
preferentially allocating attention (i.e., internal or external), that individual is paying less attention 
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to the task at hand. In both models, this paradigm tends to lead to poor performance in social 
situations due to the lack of attentional resources allocated towards the conversation. 
Interestingly, the preferential allocation of attentional resources towards threat used as a coping 
mechanism for social anxiety may actually lead to the increased likelihood of the feared 
consequence and negative social evaluations.  
Empirical Support for Cognitive Models 
 Cognitive models of social anxiety posit that individuals with social anxiety have skewed 
and proportionally more negative self-images (mental representation) in relation to social 
situations (Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). This mental representation is not an 
objective representation of the self, but is more of a distorted interpretation or perception of what 
the self looks like. A study by Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, and Moscovitch (2011) 
had 80 undergraduates (41 = high and 39 = low in social anxiety) complete the Waterloo Images 
and Memories Interview (WIMI). The WIMI is a modified version of the Autobiographical 
Interview (AI; Lavine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002) and was designed to assess 
the accessibility and nature of individual’s mental images as autobiographical recollections. 
Results suggested that individuals with social anxiety had higher rates of negative imagery, closer 
links between negative imagery and past negative social events, higher detail for negative vs. 
positive imagery, as well as felt more negative emotions and cognitions around those mental 
representations. Similar results have been shown in various studies (Blasi, Cavani, Pavia, Baido, 
Grutta & Schimmenti, 2015; Chiupka, Moscovitch & Bielak, 2012; Hackmann, Clark, & 
McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Moscovitch, 
Chiupka, & Gavric, 2013; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011; 
Schreiber & Steilm, 2013; Vassilopoulos, 2012). These results suggest that both those with and 
without social anxiety have negative autobiographical memories and self-imagery; however, 
those with social anxiety have an elevated level of negative imagery. 
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This mental representation in social anxiety likely has many sources: 1) autobiographical 
recollection of past social events, 2) actual images of the self (photographs), and 3) internal and 
external cues (Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Morgan, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Autobiographical memories and actual images of the self are used to create a base-line self-
image, which internal (e.g., heart-rate, sweating, thoughts, safety behavior) and external (e.g., 
others facial expression, reactions, body language, verbal language) cues modify (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Therefore, ones’ self-image is constantly fluctuating. For example, an 
individual may hold a neutral self-image based on past experiences and photos of the self; 
however, others snickering, giggling, in combination with sweating and an accelerated heart rate 
will lead to the neutral self-image to turn into a negative one.  
 One of the more studied aspects related to mental self-imagery is the individual’s 
perceived social performance. Generally, research suggests that individuals with social anxiety 
perceive their own performance in social situations as worse than it actually is (e.g.,Hirsch & 
Clark, 2004; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; 
Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitvh, 2011; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). In other 
words, upon entering a social situation their mental self-representation of their performance is 
starting off more negative, which contributes to negative evaluations about self-performance. For 
example, Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, and Williams (2003) had patients with social phobia 
participate in two conversations with strangers: one while holding a neutral self-image in mind 
and one while holding a negative self-image. Participants rated their anxiety symptomology and 
performance after both conversations. Results found that holding a negative self-image in mind 
during a conversation led to more anxious symptomology as well as worse self-rated performance 
compared to the neutral control. These results have been supported through additional research on 
this topic (e.g., Makkar & Grisham, 2011; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; see Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 
2006, for a review), as well as findings that socially anxious individuals are affected by negative 
self-imagery manipulations more than individuals without anxiety (e.g., Brozovich & Heimberg, 
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2013; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Makkar & Grisham, 2011; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007; 
Vassilopoulos, 2005). In addition, findings are consistent that individuals with social anxiety 
perceive the self as performing worse only for social situations, and not for non-social settings 
(e.g., Efran & Korn, 1969). 
This last finding suggests that the mental self-representation and perceptual distortions 
are specific to social situations. Together, these results imply that higher levels of social anxiety 
are related to more negative self-imagery, which leads to skewed perceptions of performance, 
which, in turn, leads to more skewed self-images. It is the cyclical nature between self-image and 
perception that cognitive models of social anxiety suggest is a maintenance factor.  
 An additional component to the cognitive models of social anxiety is that the individual’s 
self-image is compared to the perceived expectations that the audience holds for the individual. In 
other words, the socially anxious person compares his or her self-image in a social situation with 
what he or she thinks the audience expects from him or her. In order to avoid negative evaluation, 
the socially anxious individual feels compelled to act and be perceived in the manner that the 
audience anticipates and desires. If the individual has a self-image that is not meeting the 
perceived expected standards of the audience, then the individual feels there is a high likelihood 
of negative evaluation. Thus, the greater the discrepancy between the self-image and perceived 
expectation, the more anxious symptomology will be experienced (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Wallace & Alden, 1991). Research suggests that 
individuals with social anxiety have beliefs that others hold expectations of them that they cannot 
meet (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Wallace & Alden, 1991). One study evaluating this phenomenon 
split 96 undergraduates into high and low socially anxious groups and presented them with a 
paradigm to measure self-established standards and self-efficacy to meet those standards 
(Wallace & Alden, 1991). Participants completed conversations in the lab to simulate everyday 
conversation. Participants rated the level of performance (i.e., how well they would have to 
converse), their ability to meet that level of performance, and judged whether the conversation 
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was a successful or unsuccessful interaction. These results found that socially anxious individuals 
believe that others (the experimenter and the other party of the conversation) had standards for 
the conversation that the individual with social anxiety could not meet; whereas, the non-anxious 
individuals believed they had the skills to meet the audience expectations. Similar results have 
been found using different methodology, such as within getting-to-know-you paradigms (e.g., 
Doerfler & Aron, 1995; Laurenti, Bruch, & Haase, 2008) and responding to questions tasks (e.g., 
Strauman, 1989). Overall, it appears that those with social anxiety views themselves as less able 
to meet the expectations of others, which can facilitate negative imagery. 
 In addition to having discrepancies between self-images and expectations, individuals 
with social anxiety rate these discrepancies as more likely to lead to negative evaluation. For 
example, Voncken, Bögels, and de Vries (2003) assessed the level of judgmental bias or 
probability they expected to be negatively evaluated in various situations among individuals with 
social anxiety and a control group. Participants arranged 4 outcomes (positive, neutral, mildly-
negative, and profoundly-negative) from least to most likely to occur during social situations. 
Results showed that the social anxiety group reported a negative evaluation was more likely to 
occur than a positive one, whereas this bias was not shown in the non-anxious group, indicating a 
judgmental bias. Other studies have similarly found that individuals with social anxiety will 
assume that a negative outcome is more likely than a non-anxious person (Foa, Franklin, Perry, & 
Herbert, 1996; Lucock & Salkovskis, 1988; Poulton & Andrews, 1994; Spence, Donovan, & 
Brechman-Toussaint, 1999). 
 If a socially anxious individual perceives a discrepancy between their self-image and the 
audience expectation, the fear of negative evaluation will trigger a fear response, since fear of 
negative evaluation is the key feature of social anxiety. Cognitive theories suggest that this fear 
response consists of cognitive, behavioral, and physical symptoms (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). Rapee and Heimberg (1997) posit that as the probability for negative 
evaluation increases, so does the state anxiety and fear response. One early study evaluating this 
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had individuals with and without social anxiety partake in three-minute role-playing interactions 
and one impromptu speech (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985). After each task, participants 
completed self-report measures of anxiety, cognitive symptomology, behavioral symptomology 
and psychological arousal. As expected, individuals with high social anxiety experienced 
significantly more anxiety during each task, in addition to more physiological activation (e.g., 
sweating, heart-rate), negative thoughts, and avoidance behavior. Similar symptomology 
presentation has been shown in numerous other studies (e.g., Stopa & Clark, 1993; Turner, 
Beidel, & Larkin, 1986). 
 Individuals with social anxiety experience a common set of cognitions, behavior, and 
physiology in relation to their anxiety. Research suggests that common cognitions in individuals 
with social anxiety are related to higher levels of negative self-evaluation and irrational beliefs 
(e.g., Gormally, Sipps, Raphael, Edwin, & Varvil-Weld, 1981; Stopa & Clark, 1993). In addition, 
individuals with social anxiety typically engage in safety behaviors, or behaviors aimed towards 
avoiding or decreasing the likelihood of negative evaluation, during social situations (e.g., 
standing in the back of the room, talking very little, holding on to objects to avoid shaking, 
avoiding eye-contact; Hofmann, 2007; McManus, Sacadura, & Clark, 2008; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997; Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Wells, Clark, Salkovskis, Ludgate, Hackmann, & 
Gelderm, 1995). Interestingly, safety behaviors are often a hindrance to desired social skills, thus 
using safety behaviors to avoid negative social evaluation can actually increase its likelihood. For 
example, if an individual avoids eye-contact during a conversation as a safety behavior, the 
observers may perceive the individual as being uninterested, snobby, or arrogant (McManus, 
Sacadura, & Clark, 2008).  
In addition to cognitive and behavioral symptoms described previously, physiological 
symptoms are significant in the maintenance of social anxiety. Physiological symptoms 
experienced by those with social anxiety include accelerated heart rate, sweating, blushing, 
stammering, or feeling faint (APA, 2013; Reich, Noyes, & Yates, 1988; Vassilopoulos, 2005). 
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Subsequently, these cognitive, behavioral, and physiology symptoms of anxiety experienced 
during a social situation influence the mental representation of the self, thus creating a more 
negative self-image or mental representation. This more negative self-image leads to a larger 
discrepancy between the self-image and audience expectations, thus leading to a higher perceived 
likelihood of negative evaluation, which leads to and increased cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological symptomology. The cyclical nature of these symptoms is a core feature of the 
cognitive theories of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 In addition to the cyclical nature of cognitions, behavior, and physiology symptoms, 
presented above, cognitive models suggest that individuals will preferentially allocate attentional 
resources to both internal and external stimuli to monitor the threatening situation (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Both Rapee and Heimberg (1997) and Clark and Wells 
(1995) suggest that individuals with social anxiety will preferentially allocate attention internally. 
This internal bias of attention manifests itself as focusing on cognitions (e.g., negative self-talk; 
Stopa & Clark, 1993), perceptions, and physiological symptoms (Johannsson & Ost, 1982; 
Mansell, Clark, & Elhers, 2003) that are related to the feared situation. Internal attentional bias or 
self-focus has been shown to be very common in social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). For example, an individual with social anxiety may enter a conversation and 
begin to realize that he or she is sweating. Sweating becomes the focus of attention, and then 
negative self-thoughts percolates and even more anxious physiology arises. The individual 
preferentially focus on the internal symptoms, manifestations of anxiety, and internalizations of 
threat while not giving any attention to external stimuli (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997).  
 Melchior and Cheek (1990) evaluated this phenomenon among 58 college students who 
completed a conversation with a partner and then rated their performance. Those who scored 
higher in terms of social anxiety reported spending more time focused on themselves, on their 
anxious thoughts, and their anxious physiology during the conversation compared to those low in 
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social anxiety. Similar findings have been consistently found (e.g., Hope & Heimberg, 1988; 
Monfries & Kafer, 1994; Saboonchi & Lundh, 1997, Mellings and Alden, 2000). In addition, 
research suggests that self-focused attention leads to more social anxiety (Bögels & Lamers, 
2002), enhances social anxiety symptomology (Bögels & Mansell, 2004), and exasperates 
negative self-talk, anxiety, and physiological arousal (Bögels, Alperts, & de Jong, 1996; Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1998; Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000). It is important to mention that 
self-focused attention occurs not only in clinical patients (Alden, Teschuk, & Tee, 1992; Mansell, 
Clark, & Elhers, 2003; Melling & Alden, 2000) but also in subclinical populations (Clark & 
McManus, 2002; Stein, Torgrud, & Walker, 2000). Overall, these findings suggest that 
individuals with social anxiety engage in heightened levels of self-focused attention when 
partaking in social situations, and their attention is focused on negative self-talk and physiology, 
which detrimentally impacts the conversation and contributes to social anxiety.  
 Although Clark and Wells (1995) focuses less on external attentional biases, Rapee and 
Heimberg (1997) suggest that individuals with social anxiety preferentially allocate attention 
towards threat related external stimuli. For example, Mogg, Philippot and Bradley (2004) had 
individuals diagnosed with social anxiety and a control group complete a dot-probe paradigm. 
Participants saw pairs of faces side by side. These pictures would disappear and would reveal 
either a vertical or horizontal orientation of dots (e.g., “:” or “˖˖”) behind one of the images. The 
participant is told to indicate which orientation the dots are in as quickly as possible. The face 
pairs included a combination either of angry, neutral, or happy faces paired with a neutral face of 
the same person. Results suggested that the socially anxious individuals were significantly 
quicker at detecting the orientation of the dot when they followed angry faces when compared to 
the other faces and to the control group. These results, along with similar studies, suggest that 
those with social anxiety preferentially allocated their attention to the threatening stimuli, 
supporting cognitive theories of social anxiety (e.g., Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Gilboa-
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Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2003, 2004; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002; Musa, Lepine, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Spector, Pecknold, & Libman, 2003).  
  In summary, considerable research has shown support for cognitive models of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Moreover, individuals with social 
anxiety appear to have a negative self-image (mental representation) that impacts their 
comparisons to expectations, judgements of consequences, and cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological symptoms. In turn, these factors then influence the mental representation. The 
spiraling nature of this anxiety model is thought to be a function of how well an individual can 
control attention (Moran, 2016). In other words, an individual who has more control of their 
attention may be able to avoid the negative processing that maintains the cyclical nature of social 
anxiety. For this reason, working memory models will be discussed. 
Working Memory Perspectives  
 Working memory is typically thought of as a system with a limited capacity, which 
involves the retention and manipulation of a limited amount of information in service to more 
complex mental functions (Baddeley, 2003, 2012; Moran, 2016). Many models of working 
memory exist, however Baddeley’s (2003, 2012) multi-component model is most often cited. 
Baddeley’s (2003) tripartite-model suggests that working memory is made up of two slave 
subsystems (phonological and visuospatial) and the attentional controller (central executive). The 
phonological and visuospatial system are thought to encompass storage and rehearsal for their 
respective information modalities. The phonological loop processes 
auditory/language/phonologically related information, whereas the visuospatial sketchpad 
processes visually perceived information. The central executive allocates where attention is 
located as well as which slave system is given resources. The central executive is generally 
thought to deal with the processing of information, manipulation, and updating information in 
short-term memory. Due to critical reviews of the tripartite model of working memory being too 
vague (Kintsch, 1998) and not incorporating the concepts of meaning or long term memory 
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(Neath, 2000), Baddeley (2012) expanded the model to include an episodic buffer function. The 
episodic buffer processes information that includes both phonological and visuospatial 
components, as well as making the connection between short-term memory and long-term 
memory.  
 Baddeley’s models of working memory have greatly influenced the understanding of 
working memory, in addition to having the partitioning of working memory into components 
being supported by the literature (Brooks, 1968; Coltheart, 1993; Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, 
Allamano, & Wilson, 1999; Murray, 1968). For example, Brooks (1968) manipulated the mode 
by which information can be encoded and responded to. Participants completed two tasks: read a 
sentence and determine whether each word was a noun or not (verbal mode); and hold the image 
on an "F" in mind and determine whether each corner was at the extreme top or bottom ends 
(visuospatial mode). In addition, participants were tasked with responding in both tasks via two 
modalities: verbally stating yes/no (verbal mode) and pointing to yes/no on a paper (visuospatial). 
The results suggest that when a task involves processing and responding via the same modality 
the participant was much slower to respond, whereas when the task was in one modality and the 
response was in another the participant was much quicker. In other words, the verbal-
phonological response interfered with the verbal-phonological task (reading a sentence), but did 
not interfere with the visuospatial task (determine the corners on an "F"). Similarly, the 
visual/spatial response interfered with the visuospatial task, but did not interfere with the verbal-
phonological task. These results suggest that loading the task with either just phonological or just 
visuospatial components interferes with the processing of information and responding because 
that underlying working memory component is taxed. When separating the task's nature from the 
responses nature, there was not interference. Therefore, phonological and visuospatial processing 
appear to be separate functions within working memory.  
 Although Baddeley's (2003, 2012) model of working memory has been the dominant 
theory, a number of other models of working memory have been proposed. An early theory by 
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Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed the Modal Model of working memory in which the 
attention and memory systems could be broken into three portions: sensory memory, short-term 
memory, and long-term memory, but failed to gain the attention that Baddeley's model received. 
Cowan’s (1999) embedded-processes model of working memory proposes that attention and its 
limited capacity are the functions of working memory. This model focuses more on attention in 
general and how various sets of information (long-term memory, relevant information, irrelevant 
information) become the focus. In addition, Postle and Pasternak (2009) proposed a state model 
of working memory, in which there are different states of memory (e.g., long term and short 
term). Through this model, working memory is thought to be a flexible perception and 
representation of sensation and incoming information we perceive. Thus, whatever information 
we devote our attention towards is considered in working memory (Postle & Pasternak, 2009). 
Generally, regardless of the component types or different functions involved in working 
memory models, most models agree that working memory has a limited capacity (Atkinson & 
Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley, 2003, 2012; Cowan, 1999; Postle & Pasternak, 2009). For example, 
Lange et al. (2016) had participants complete the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, in which 
participants sort series of cards according to rules that periodically change (e.g., stacking by 
color, stacking by shape), while manipulating the number of rules from 3 to 4. Increasing the 
number of rules was done to increase the amount of information in working memory, thus loading 
the working memory system. Results showed that participants performed worse when their 
working memory was more loaded. Research has constantly shown performance deficits while 
working memory is loaded (Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2005; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Due to the limited 
capacity of working memory, it is clear that when working memory is loaded down with one task, 
there are less resources to complete another task.  
In order to better understand the limited capacity of working memory, it is imperative to 
evaluate the specific functions within the executive function. A latent variable analysis by Miyake 
et al. (2000) discovered three executive functions: Inhibition, Shifting, and Updating. According 
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to Miyake et al. (2000), shifting is the ability to shift back and forth between various tasks; 
inhibition is the ability to inhibit automatic responses or disruption from task-irrelevant stimuli; 
updating is the ability to update and monitor what is currently in working memory. To understand 
how anxiety is related to working memory and executive control, the attentional control theory 
(Eysenck et al., 2007), one of the most researched theories in this field, will be elaborated. 
Attentional Control Theory 
 Working memory in relation to anxiety has been extensively studied over the past couple 
of decades (see Moran, 2016, for a review). For example, MacLeod and Donnellan (1993) had 
individuals with and without social anxiety complete a grammatical reasoning task to measure 
working memory ability. Participants were shown strings of digits and were told to rehearse the 
digits in their head. While continuing to rehearse the digits, participants were shown a pair of 
letters and a corresponding sentence, in which participants had to judge whether the sentence 
about the letters was true or false. Results showed that the socially anxious group had a more 
difficult time stating whether the sentence was true or not, compared to both non-socially 
threatening words and the control group. These results indicate that those individuals with social 
anxiety had a more difficult time with a task involving working memory. Similar studies also 
have found that individuals with social anxiety have difficulty performing cognitive tasks (e.g., 
Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker & Eysenck, 2009; Mattia, 
Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009 for a review). The cognitive models 
of social anxiety and working memory models alone do little to explain why socially anxious 
individuals cannot cognitively perform as well as normal control in these situations.  
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007) developed attentional control theory that 
helps explicate why and how social anxiety influences cognitive activity. Attentional control 
theory, established from the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), suggests that 
working memory has a limited capacity, and the main working memory function that is affected 
by anxiety is the executive function or central executive. A main concept of the attentional 
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control theory is the relationship between top-down (executive controlled) and bottom-up 
(stimulus controlled) attention. This perspective proposes that anxiety increases bottom-up 
processing, thus decreasing top-down processing, such that those with anxiety will show deficits 
in tasks that involve top-down processing. This is argued to be the cause for the common finding 
that social anxiety leads to poorer performance in tasks (e.g., Pacheco-Ungietti, Acosta, Callejas, 
& Lupianez, 2010; Wieser, Paula, & Mühlberger, 2009). In an early evaluation of these 
predictions, Rapee (1993) found that, in relation to Baddeley’s (2003) working memory model, 
some effects are found in the phonological loop, but most of the effects are found in the central 
executive. Eysenck et al., (2007) suggests that worry is the key disruptive factor for anxiety, thus 
when an individual is devoting attentional resources towards worrying, there are less attentional 
resources to be devoted to other tasks (e.g., Stroop Task). Pacheco-Unguetti, Acost, Callejas, and 
Lupianez (2010) had participants complete an attention network task, which measures the 
executive control network, and found that trait levels of anxiety were associated with deficits in 
executive functioning, whereas state anxiety did not show those deficits. These results support the 
attentional control theory, such that pathological anxiety, typically seen in generalized anxiety 
and social anxiety, is more closely related to executive control deficits compared to simply 
inducing state anxiety. 
The hallmark principle of the attentional control theory is the differentiation between 
effectiveness (i.e., task performance) and efficiency (i.e., the relationship between effectiveness 
and how much effort was used for that task performance). Generally, the more effort put forth in 
a task, the lower the efficiency. Some research shows deficits in task performance for social 
anxiety (e.g., Pacheco-Ungietti, Acosta, Callejas, & Lupianez, 2010; Wieser, Paula, & 
Mühlberger, 2009), whereas others do not (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; MacLeod & 
Donnellan, 1993). The attentional control theory suggests that where there is not a deficit in 
effectiveness (performance), there may be a deficit in efficiency. In other words, it is possible that 
someone who is socially anxious will perform well (high effectiveness) even though they may be 
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directing more attentional resources towards threat related tasks, because they may by using 
additional resources (low efficiency) to perform as well as others. When performance is not 
effected in a task, efficiency may be. Someone who has anxiety may do as well as an individual 
will no anxiety in a working memory task, however they may be using more resources to do just 
as well, therefore having low efficiency. This idea has been supported in a number of studies. For 
example, Ansari and Derakshan (2011a) split 32 undergraduate participants into high and low 
social anxiety groups and had each group complete a mixed anti-saccade task while collecting 
electroencephalography. In this paradigm, the participant was shown a fixation point (e.g., “+”) 
and then a target stimulus (e.g., a black oval) to the left or right periphery. The participant is 
asked to look away from the target stimulus and direct attention towards the mirror image spot on 
the opposite side of the screen. The correct response (looking away from the stimuli) requires that 
the individual inhibit (control their attention) making a reflexive saccade towards the target 
stimulus as well as making a voluntary motor movement of the eyes towards the mirror image 
spot (Munoz & Everling, 2004). A typical variation of the anti-saccade task, that was used in this 
study, is the mixed anti-saccade task, in which the individual is asked to look away from some 
stimuli (anti-saccade) and look towards some stimuli (pro-saccade) using simple prompts (e.g., 
“towards” or “away”) before the start of each stimuli presentation (e.g., Ansari, Derakshan, & 
Richards, 2008; Cornwell, Mueller, Kaplan, Grillon, & Ernst, 2012). 
Contingent negative variation, which is brain activity collected by the 
electroencephalography and is thought to be a measure of the amount of resources utilized to 
respond to the upcoming stimuli was collected in this study. The CNV was used to measure the 
level of cognitive effort put forth in the task. Results found that there was little difference 
between high and low anxious individuals for performance (error rates), but those in the high 
anxiety group showed greater contingent negative variation, indicating higher cognitive effort to 
complete the task. Similar results illustrating deficits in efficiency have been found in a number 
of studies (e.g., Fales et al., 2008; Hadwin, Brogan, & Stevenson, 2005; Judah et al., 2013; 
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Richards, French, Keogh, & Carter, 2000; Smith, Bellamy, Collins, & Newell, 2001; see 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009 for a review). Research involving the attentional control theory has 
focused primarily on two functions that seem to be influenced by anxiety (i.e., shifting and 
inhibition). It is thought that the updating function primarily involves memory as opposed to 
attention, and therefore is less affected by anxiety and less relevant to attentional research 
(Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009).  
Shifting 
Shifting is thought to be the fluency and ability to shift attention between multiple 
sources of information (Miyake et al., 2000). It takes cognitive resources to shift between two 
tasks, thus individuals with anxiety disorders, who persistently worry, will have diminished 
attentional resources to shift attention. Tasks that involve the shifting of attention or processing 
between multiple sources loads highly on the shifting component. Paradigms that involve task-
switching typically involve two conditions. The participant completes the same two tasks in both 
conditions; however in one condition the participant must switch between the two tasks rapidly, 
whereas the other condition completes each task separately in a sequential order. Switching tasks 
rapidly in thought to use more attentional resources (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009).  
A study by Ansari, Derakshan, and Richards (2008) investigated how anxiety affects the 
shifting function. Participants completed a mixed anti-saccade task, in which they alternated 
between looking towards a stimulus (task 1) and looking away from a stimulus (task 2). It is 
typically shown that when individuals switch from an anti-saccade trial to a pro-saccade trial their 
performance increases (i.e., they are faster at completing the pro-saccade) compared to when the 
participant completes multiple pro-saccades trials in a row. This effect is called the “switching 
benefit” (Cherkasova, Manoach, Intriligator, & Barton, 2002). Nieuwenhuis, Broerse, Nielen, and 
Jong (2004) suggest that this finding is due to failures in the consistency of focused attention. 
Ansari, Derakshan, and Richards (2008) had individuals with high and low anxiety complete a 
mixed anti-saccade task and found that the low anxious group showed the typical switching 
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benefit, whereas the high anxiety group did not show a switching benefit. These results suggest 
that anxiety impairs the ability to shift effectively between tasks. Similar studies have 
corroborated these findings (Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009; Judah et al., 2013). 
Inhibition  
Derakshan and Eysenck (2009) suggests that the inhibition function requires the use of 
attentional control to regulate attention and responses in the face of distracting stimuli, as well as 
maintaining task relevant attention and behavior. It takes mental energy and resources to maintain 
attention towards the task at hand, ignore irrelevant information, and control responses to task 
irrelevant behavior, and only respond to task relevant stimuli. The ability to do these functions 
can be understood through the race model proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984). Logan and 
Cowan (1984) suggest that a “go” process, which tell the body to respond to a stimulus, is in 
competition with the “stopping” process, which tells the body to inhibit a response.  
Logan and Cowan (1984) use a stop-signal task to illustrate and support their theory. 
Participants are shown a series of visual stimuli and told to respond (e.g., press a button) as fast as 
they can to a specific stimulus (go-signal). A portion of the go-signal trials will have an auditory 
sound (e.g., "beep"; stop-signal) after the stimuli presentation, which indicates to the participant 
that they should withhold from responding to the stimuli. The time between the go-signal and 
stop-signal (Stop-signal delay) typically varies. If the stop-signal delay is short, then it is easier 
and more likely that a response will be inhibited. If the stop-signal delay is long, then it is 
difficult and more unlikely that a response will be inhibited. As the task proceeds, the stop-signal 
delay increases in time when the participant is able to inhibit a response. If the participant is 
unable to inhibit the response, then the stop-signal delay decreases. By doing this, the paradigm 
determines the participant’s stop signal reaction time, which is the average amount of time 
required for the participant to inhibit a response after hearing the stop signal (Weinback, 
Kalalthroff, Avnit, & Henik, 2015). Logan, Cowan and Davis (1994) and Logan and Cowan 
(1984) used their race-horse model of inhibition to explain that individuals with poor inhibition in 
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the stop-signal task (i.e., longer stop-signal reaction time) have slower inhibition processes, which 
lead to the longer time necessary to stop or inhibit a "go-process" (Band, van Boxtel, & Logan, 
2003).  
Ansari and Derakshan (2010) suggest that some inhibitory responses in the literature are 
made up of two separable functions: Inhibitory control and volitional action control. Inhibitory 
control is the ability to stop an ongoing process or a prepotent response. Volitional action control 
is the ability to engage and follow through with an alternative response. This distinction is 
necessary for tasks that involve both the inhibition of a proponent response and the engagement 
of an alternative response (i.e., an anti-saccade task). Research by Ansari and Derakshan (2010) 
using a delayed-mixed anti-saccade task, a variation of the anti-saccade in which participants are 
shown a traditional anti-saccade task; however, participants are told to not make a saccade (look 
towards or away the stimuli depending on the trial rules) until they hear an audible beep. Ansari 
and Derakshan (2010) suggest that controlling reflexive saccades initially after the stimuli 
presentation is a measure of inhibitory attentional control, whereas the ability to make the correct 
saccade movements after the audible beep is a measure of volition action control (the engagement 
in a correct response). Results showed that individuals with social anxiety did not have a problem 
directing their saccade after the beep, but did show impairments in the ability to control reflexive 
saccades. These findings corroborate additional research suggesting that anxiety impairs the 
inhibitory control function and not the volitional action control function associated with inhibition 
(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Biship, 2009; 
Calvo, & Eysneck, 1996; Garner, Ainsworth, Guold, Gardner, & Baldwin, 2009; Moran & 
Moser, 2015; Pacheco-Ungietti, Lupianez, & Acosta, 2009). 
Inhibition Tasks 
Various research paradigms have been used to determine how anxiety affects inhibitory 
processes. A commonly used task is the emotional Stroop task, derived from the color stroop task 
(MacLeod, 1991; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000). In Emotional-Stroop, tasks participants are 
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shown emotional related written words (e.g., blushing, failure, inadequate) that are printed in 
numerous colors, while the participant is told to name the color of the word. Slower or error 
responses suggest that the content of the word has grabbed the participant’s attention away from 
the task of naming the color (Ledley, & Heimberg, 2006). If the participant’s attention is drawn to 
the contextual meaning of the word, that participant is thought to have had a failure in the 
inhibition of task irrelevant stimuli. One study by Mattia, Heimberg, and Hope (1993) measured 
the response latencies for color naming for both individuals with social anxiety and matched 
controls. The stimuli were made up of social threatening, physical threatening, and neutral words 
in various colors. Results showed that the socially anxious group had longer latencies for all word 
groups compared to the matched controls; however, the socially threatening words showed the 
longest latencies for those in the socially anxious group. These finding suggest that individuals 
with social anxiety have a difficult time inhibiting task irrelevant stimuli in general, but have 
increased difficulty when that stimuli are threat related. These findings have been corroborated by 
additional research (Askew, Hagel, & Morgan, 2015; Grant & Beck, 2006; Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Maidenburg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky, 1996; Masiam, 
McNeil, Cohn, & Hope, 1999; McNeil et al., 1995; Price, Siegle, & Mohlman, 2012; Rutherford, 
MacLeod, & Campbell, 2004), including for individuals who are simply shy (DiPino & Riskind, 
2000). It is thought that because individuals with anxiety are allocating increased attentional 
resources towards the meaning of the threatening words, they have less attentional resources to 
allocate towards the task of naming the color, leading to an inhibition failure (Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Mogg, & Bradley, 2009; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; Yiend, 2010). 
Another common task used to measure inhibition deficits within anxiety is an anti-
saccade task, as it measures the ability to control attention using eye-movements. For example, 
Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, and Eysenck (2009) used a pair of studies to investigate 
anxiety’s relationship to the anti-saccade task. In the first study, participants high and low in 
anxiety completed a traditional mixed-anti-saccade task, in which the target stimuli was an oval 
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dot. Results showed that the high anxiety group had longer latencies during the anti-saccade trials 
compared to the low anxiety group, indicating anxiety is characterized by difficulties with 
inhibition of a prepotent response. In the second study, Derakshan and colleagues (2009) used 
various facial expressions (angry, happy, and neutral) as the target stimuli to test how threat-
related stimuli affects inhibition. Results found that, again, the high anxiety group had longer 
latencies during the anti-saccade trials compared to individuals with low anxiety, but in addition 
the anxious group showed even slower latencies in anti-saccade trials for the threat related 
stimuli. This, along with similar studies, suggests that individuals with anxiety have difficulty 
with inhibition during the anti-saccade task (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Cornwell, 
Mueller, Kaplan, Grillon, & Ernst, 2012; Garner, Ainsworth, Guold, Gardner, & Baldwin, 2009; 
Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, Benson, Bradley, Hardin, Liversedge et al., 2012; Wright, Dobson, & 
Sears, 2012), and this effects is exacerbated by threat related stimuli (Chen, Clarke, Watson, 
Macleod, & Guaastella, 2014; Chen, Clarke, Watson, Macleod, & Guaastella, 2015). These 
results are also shown when specifically looking at social anxiety (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010; 
Chen, Clarke, Watson, Macleod, & Guaastella, 2015; Judah et al., 2013; Wieser, Pauli, & 
Mühlberger, 2009). 
An interesting feature of using the anti-saccade task is the ability to measure both the 
effectiveness and efficiency functions of the Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Error rates are thought to be a measurement of task performance (effectiveness), whereas latency 
of anti-saccades are thought to be a measure of how much effort it took to look away (efficiency) 
(Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a; Ansari & Derakshan, 2011b; Derakshan et al., 2009). Some 
research shows that anxiety impacts the effectiveness of inhibition tasks (Ansari, & Derakshan, 
2010; Garner, Ainsworth, Guold, Gardner, & Baldwin, 2009; Wieser, Pauli, & Mühlberger, 
2009), whereas others only find deficits in efficiency (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; 
Chen, Clarke, Watson, Macleod, & Guaastella, 2015; Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & 
Eysenck, 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, Benson, Bradley, Hardin, Liversedge et al., 2012). 
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Regardless of the type of impairment, it is clear that anxiety detrimentally impacts the ability to 
control inhibition during an anti-saccade task.  
 Another task commonly used to measure inhibition is the stop-signal task, which 
measures the ability to stop a process that already has been initiated (Logan, 1994; Logan & 
Cowan, 1984). Logan, Cowan and Davis (1994) and Logan and Cowan (1984) used their race-
horse model of inhibition to explain that individuals with poor inhibition in the stop-signal task 
(i.e., longer stop-signal reaction time) have slower inhibition processes, which lead to the longer 
time necessary to stop a "go-process" (Band, van Boxtel, & Logan, 2003). A meta-analysis by 
Lipszyc and Schachar (2010) compiled all studies up to 2009 that measured inhibition using a 
stop-signal task which also measured whether psychopathology affected performance. Results 
showed that attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
schizophrenia showed impaired inhibition; however, anxiety showed no deficit. These results 
seem to contradict theories of anxiety. However, one study by Savostyanov et al. (2009) used a 
stop-signal task to measure the neural desynchronization (the overall changes in rhythmic nature 
of brain waves) associated with inhibition in the stop signal task. These results suggest that 
anxiety may not affect performance (effectiveness) but does affect how efficient (efficiency) the 
individual is at inhibiting a response, which supports the attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
al., 2007).  
A concern with using stop-signal task research is the reliance on the stop-signal reaction 
time as a measure of inhibition ability. There are a number of factors that affect stop-signal 
reaction time that are typically unmentioned in published articles, such as the process of 
extracting the stop-signal reaction time without controlling for differences in mean reaction time 
and slowed performance to ensure accuracy (Alderson, Rapport, & Kofler, 2007; Logan, 
Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). 
Another Commonly used task to measure inhibition is the Go/No-go task (Logan, & 
Cowan, 1984).  In the Go/No-go task, participants’ inhibition ability is measured by presenting a 
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frequent amount of trials that require a response (“go”-trials; e.g., pressing a button) in addition to 
a more infrequent number of trials that require the participant to resist making a response (“no-
go”-trials; e.g., inhibit pressing a button) (Grillon, Robinson, Krimsky, O’Connell, Alvarez, & 
Ernst, 2016; Bari & Robbins, 2013). The high frequency of go-trials creates a prepotent go-
response to press the button. When the no-go stimuli appear (the stimuli that requires no 
response), the individual must inhibit the prepotent response to press the button. The ability to 
inhibit a response to the infrequent no-go stimuli is a measure of the individual’s inhibition 
(Grillon, Robinson, Krimsky, O’Connell, Alvarez, & Ernst, 2016; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Wilson, Flinkbeiner, de Joux, Russel, & Helton, 2016). The failure to 
inhibit the prepotent response during a no-go trial (commission error) has been related to two 
functions: the lapse of attention to the task due to distracting thoughts (Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) and a failure in the inhibition of the prepotent response 
(Head & Helton, 2013; Peebles & Bothell, 2004). Taken together, these two hypotheses suggest 
that if the participant is able to maintain attention to the task, the errors measured in the study are 
a true representation of a failure to inhibit a prepotent response (Grillon, Robinson, Krimsky, 
O’Connell, Alvarez, & Ernst, 2016; Head & Helton, 2013).  
A variation of the Go/No-go task is the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). In this task, participants are shown 
stimuli, some which require a response and some which require the inhibition of a response, just 
as the Go/No-go task; however, there are typically a smaller ratio of no-go trails. The less no-go 
trials lead to an even more persistent prepotent go-response to press the button compared to the 
traditional Go/No-go task (Peebles & Bothell, 2004; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997). In addition to the difference in the ratio of go to no-go trials, the SART typically 
uses 9 numbers (1-9) as the response buttons. Participants are shown a series of numbers and are 
told to press the button that corresponds to the number on the screen (go-trials), but are told to not 
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respond to one number (no-go-trials; traditionally the “3”). In general, both the Go/No-go task 
and the SART are used to measure inhibition.  
Although the Go/No-go task appears to be a useful measure of behavioral inhibition, it is 
infrequently used in the anxiety literature. A meta-analysis by Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, 
Thayapararjah, and Schachar (2014) compiled 318 studies that covered 11 different psychological 
disorders using the Go/No-go task, and found that anxiety disorders constantly showed deficits in 
the ability to inhibit the go-response. These findings, in addition to other studies (e.g., Grillon, 
Robinson, Krimsky, O’Connell, Alvarez, & Ernst, 2016), suggest that anxiety impairs inhibition. 
However, other studies have failed to find behavioral deficits but did find that individuals with 
anxiety have to compensate (e.g., more neural activity, longer response latency) more to perform 
as well as controls (Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009). In lieu of these contradictory findings, it 
is important to gain more precise measures and comparisons of the behavioral data (performance) 
and the effort it takes to complete these tasks (effectiveness). Although considerable research has 
used behavioral inhibition tasks to determine possible neural deficits in anxiety, these studies do 
not offer a clear representation of the neural activity underlying task performance and efficiency. 
Psychophysiological (Event Related Potentials) 
Using electroencephalography (EEG) offers a valuable insight to neural responses (Luck, 
2012), especially in relation to social anxiety (Judah et al., 2013; Moser, Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & 
Simons, 2008). EEG is the collection of electrical potentials (voltage) from the brain that are 
measured using electrodes on the scalp. To obtain Event related potentials (ERP’s) from the EEG, 
the EEG waveform must be segmented. These segments (epochs) are time locked in relation to an 
event marker in the data file. The ERP segments represent neural activity associated with that 
event and internal (neural) and external (environmental) noise. The same epoched segments of 
ERP activity (segments related to the same event) are then averaged to eliminate random error, 
thus leaving the average brain activity in relation to that event (Luck, 2007, 2012, 2014). 
Therefore, ERP’s are an average of segmented portions of an overall EEG waveform that are time 
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locked (epoched) to a specific event (e.g., stimuli onset, behavioral response). That is, ERP’s are 
the average electrical potentials produced by the brain in relation to specific events. The non-
invasiveness and high level of temporal resolution has led to ERP’s as being immensely useful 
measures of neural activity (Luck, 2012, 2014; Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000; Woodman, 
2010). Research using ERP’s suggests that ERP’s are sensitive and influenced by different levels 
of trait anxiety (e.g., Meyer, Hajcak, Torpey-Newman, Kujawa, & Klein, 2015; Owens, 
Derakshan, & Richards, 2015; Savostyanov, Tsai, Liou, Levin, Lee, Vurganov, & Knyazev, 
2009) and social anxiety (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2011a, 2011b; Judah et al., 2013; Moser, 
Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2008; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009).  
Although consistent research shows that trait anxiety is related to different neural activity 
(e.g., ERP’s) compared to non-anxious controls, the direction (increase or decrease) of activity 
has been less consistent (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). Berggren and Derakshan (2013) suggest 
that task motivation, cognitive load, and task demands influence the direction of neural activity. 
Being highly motivated during a task puts an additional load on working memory, thus to 
complete the task effectively more cognitive resources may be allocated to compensate. An 
individual with social anxiety may be additionally motivated during a task as they may be 
anxious about being negatively evaluated during the task, thus leading to increased neural activity 
(Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). Cognitive load, as suggested 
throughout this review, affects task performance such that higher levels of cognitive load lead to 
diminished cognitive resources to complete the task, which may lead to diminished neural activity 
related to the task at hand. In relation to physiological symptoms of anxiety, worrying thoughts or 
focusing on threat related stimuli may serve as a cognitive load, thus leaving less resources to 
allocate to the task, leading to decreased neural activity towards the task. In addition, the 
difficulty of the task also may affect neural activity such that less cognitively demanding tasks 
(single-task paradigms) show less compensatory cognitive recruitment (Bishop, 2009; Ansari and 
Derakshan, 2011b), whereas more demanding tasks (dual-task paradigms) show more levels of 
32 
 
compensation (Ansari and Derakshan, 2011b; Basten, Stelzel, & Fiebach, 2011). Overall, these 
findings suggest that motivation, cognitive load (e.g., threating stimuli), and task demands are 
possible moderators to neural activity, specifically in relation to anxiety related neural 
functioning. Two specific neural components (ERP’s) that are related to this project are the N2 
and P3. 
N2 
 The N2 is negative going ERP waveform that typically peaks around 200-350 ms after 
the presentation of the target stimulus. Reports of the N2 stemmed from early research involving 
Oddball paradigms (Luck, 2014). In the classic Oddball paradigm, participants are shown 
sequences of frequent stimuli (“X’s”) with infrequent stimuli (“O’s”) intermittently displayed in 
the sequence. Participants develop a typical waveform during the frequent trials, but show an N2 
with a larger amplitude when the stimulus is infrequent, thus the N2 was thought to be affected by 
frequency of stimuli (Folstein, & Van Petten, 2008; Luck, 2014; Näätänen, & Picton, 1986). In 
addition, early research suggested that the traditional N2 can be broken into three parts: N2a, 
N2b, and N2c (Luck, 2012, 2014; Pritchard, Shappel, & Brandt, 1991). Luck (2012, 2014) 
suggests that the N2a is elicited during auditory mismatches, also coined the Mis-Matched 
Negativity, and occurs at an earlier time (100-200 ms). The N2b and N2c have been shown to be 
elicited when a deviant stimulus is presented and is task relevant. The N2b name was given to the 
N2 waveform that appeared over central sites for auditory stimuli, whereas the N2c name was 
given to the N2 waveform that appeared over posterior cites for visual stimuli (Luck, 2014; 
Renault, Ragot, Lesevre, & Redmond, 1982). Research using inhibition tasks (i.e., the Go/No-go 
and stop signal task) shows that the N2 is generally larger for the trials in which inhibition is 
necessary, which suggests that the N2 can be used as a measurement of attentional resources 
allocated to the task of inhibiting a prepotent response (Luck, 2014; Jodo & Kayama, 1992).  
 Researchers have begun to investigate how anxiety affects the N2, in which many of the 
studies use inhibition related tasks. Sehlmeyer, Konrad, Zwitserlood, Arolt, Falkenstein, and 
33 
 
Beste (2010) had individuals report their level of trait anxiety and complete a Go/No-go task 
while having EEG measurements collected.  They were interested in whether anxiety affected 
how the individual neurally responded (N2) to the No-go stimuli. Results showed that trait 
anxiety was related to higher amplitude N2’s, such that increased trait anxiety led to increased N2 
amplitude. These results, in addition to similar studies (Henderson, 2010; Hum, Manassis, & 
Lewis, 2013; Owens, Derakshan, & Richards, 2015; Righi, Mecacci, & Viggiano, 2009; Wauthia 
& Rossignol, 2016) support the attentional control theory, in that individuals use more attentional 
resources (cognitive effort) to complete a task with the same performance as individuals without 
anxiety.  
P3 
 The P3 is positive going ERP waveform that typically peaks around 250-500 ms. after the 
presentation of the target stimulus. Early research on the P3 suggests that it is made up of a 
couple of distinct components (Luck, 2014; Polich, 2012; Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). 
Researchers have broken the P3 into the P3a, which appears in the frontal region, and the P3b, 
which appears in the parietal region (Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). Generally, both the P3a 
and P3b are elicited by unpredictable and infrequent changes in stimuli; however, when 
researcher discuss the P3 they generally are referring to the P3b (Luck, 2012, 2014). Research 
finds that the P3 is affected by the probability of stimuli, thus the more infrequent a stimulus type, 
the larger the P3 associated with that stimulus (Duncan-Johnson, & Donchin, 1977; Luck, 2012, 
2014; Pritchard, 1981). More importantly, many researchers suggest that the P3 is a measure of 
resource allocation used in processing the stimulus (e.g., Isreal, Chesney, Wickens, & Donchin, 
1980; Luck, 2012, 2014). For example, Isreal et al. (1980) found that when individuals devote 
more attentional resources to a task, the P3 was larger. Similar to the N2, researchers have begun 
to investigate how the P3 is affected by anxiety. 
Generally, studies that measure the N2 also measure the P3. For example, Sehlmeyer et 
al. (2010), who used a Go/No-go task while having EEG measurements collected was, also 
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interested in how the individual’s P3 was related to the No-go stimuli for individuals with 
anxiety. They found that the P3 amplitude was impacted by anxiety; however, to a lesser degree 
than the N2. Specifically, as trait anxiety increased, the amplitude of the P3 increased. These 
results suggest that individuals with anxiety may devote more resources to inhibit the stimuli 
compared to individuals without anxiety. Similar studies also have found that anxiety influences 
the P3 waveform (Judah et al., 2013; Moser, Huppert, Duval, & Simons, 2008; Wauthia & 
Rossignol, 2016).  
Current Study and Hypothesis 
 Overall, the current models of social anxiety and the state of research suggests that 
individuals with high social anxiety have disproportional levels of negative self-imagery and that 
this imagery acts as a maintaining factor for their social anxiety (e.g., Blasi, Cavani, Pavia, Baido, 
Grutta & Schimmenti, 2015; Clark & Wells, 1995; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & 
Moscovitch, 2011; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Due to the attentional bias towards threat related 
information shown in social anxiety (e.g., Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Gilboa-Schechtman, 
Foa, & Amir, 1999; Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2003, 
2004; Mellings and Alden, 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Monfries & Kafer, 1994; Saboonchi & 
Lundh, 1997; Musa, Lepine, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Spector, Pecknold, & Libman, 2003), it was 
proposed that holding a negative self-image would lead to internal self-focus for those with social 
anxiety. Research suggests that increased self-focused attention serves as a cognitive load and 
leads to decreases in the available resources (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Judah et al., 2013; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). This decrease in cognitive resources presents itself in research paradigms as 
enhanced neural compensatory recruitment towards tasks that involve the executive function; 
however, when threat information is incorporated in the task, there appears to a decrease in neural 




 The current study aimed investigate how manipulating cognitive load and threat focus 
affects the effectiveness and efficiency of an inhibition. Specifically, self-imagery was 
manipulated to impose differing levels of cognitive load. Research suggests that individuals with 
social anxiety tend to focus on threatening information, thus inducing a negative self-image 
would serve a higher cognitive load for those with social anxiety compared to a neutral and 
positive self-image (e.g., Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003). Due 
to cognitive resources having a limited capacity (Baddeley, 2003, 2012; Eysenck et al., 2007), 
loading the executive function of individuals with social anxiety, which was expected to result in 
a decreased amount of resources available to complete the task. To measure the effects of social 
anxiety and self-imagery, both behavioral (error rates, response latency) and psychophysiological 
(neural activation) measures was collected to distinguish whether the effects are shown in 
effectiveness and/or efficiency. Since inhibition is shown to be one of the working memory 
factors that that is most affected by anxiety, a Go/No-go task was used to (Ansari & Derakshan, 
2010; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Biship, 
2009; Calvo & Eysneck, 1996).  
It was hypothesized that individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety would 
show similar performance (error rates) in the Go/No-go task; however, the individuals with high 
social anxiety would show hindered efficiency in the Go/No-go task displayed by 1) longer 
inhibition response latencies to the to-be-inhibited stimuli, 2) enhanced levels of neural activity 
(N2, P3) to inhibit a response. In addition, when manipulating self-imagery, individuals with 
social anxiety would display overall decreases in neural activity to the task compared to the 
neutral and positive self-images as well as compared to the individuals with low social anxiety, 
due to threat focusing decreasing neural recruitment. This study was hypothesized to provide 
support the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) and cognitive models (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), in addition to facilitating the understanding of how 









 Participants were recruited from the undergraduate student population at a Midwestern 
university (Oklahoma State University) via an online recruitment system (SONA) and received 
course credit for participation. Participants initially completed a short form of the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS-6; Mattick & Clarke, 1989) as a pre-screener via the online 
recruitment system. Using an extreme groups approach, those individuals who scored within the 
group cut-off were recruited into the study (≤ 4 or ≥ 7). Participants that met inclusion criteria and 
agreed to participate completed the SIAS-sf, along with additional measures, to divide the sample 
into social anxiety groups. Based on previous research (e.g., Judah, Grant, & Carlisle, 2016; 
Judah et al., 2013), participants were split using cutoffs based on the original standardized sample 
mean (M = 16.30) and standard deviation (SD = 12.48; Mattick & Clarke, 1989; Rodebaugh et al., 
2011). Participants who scored one standard deviation above the standardized mean were placed 
in the high social anxiety group, and those who scored at or below the standardized mean made 
up the low social anxiety group.  An a priori power analysis (Cohen, 1988) using the effect sizes 
found in previous studies (η2 = .14-.17; Judah et al., 2016; Judah et al., 2013) suggested a total of 
8-12 to achieve adequate power (β = .80, α = .05). In taking a conservative approach, 48 
individual’s data were collected. This approach was based on samples used in recent empirical 
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research (Judah et al., 2016; Judah et al., 2013) and in anticipation of potential attrition due to 
physiological data cleaning and to ensure adequate statistical power. 
A total of 69 participants were recruited to participate. Twenty one were excluded due to 
failure to meet SIAS-sf inclusion criteria leaving a total of 25 individuals in the high and 23 in the 
low anxiety condition that were included in data analysis. Participants were largely female (69%) 
and had an average age of 19.08 (SD = 1.49). Participant ethnicity consisted of 81.7% Caucasian, 
7% African American, 5.6% Latino/a, 1.4% Asian, 1.4% Middle Eastern, and 2.8% reported 
“Other” 
Materials   
 Social Interaction Anxiety Scale-short form (SIAS-sf; Mattick & Clarke, 1998; 
Rodebaugh et al, 2011; Rodebaugh, Wood, & Heimberg, 2007). The SIAS-sf is a 17 – item 
measure of the fear towards social interactions, in which respondents indicate the degree to which 
statements (e.g., “I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority”) are characteristic of 
them on a scale from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extremely”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
social anxiety. The SIAS has shown adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .93; Mattick 
& Clarke, 1998) which was also shown in the current sample (α = .93). (See Appendix B)  
Self-imagery Manipulation. Participants were presented with 3 image prompts adapted 
from Hackman et al. (1998, 2000) to elicit positive, neutral, and negative self-imagery. For the 
negative self-imagery condition, participants were instructed to recall a time in which they were 
anxious or embarrassed in a social situation. For the positive self-imagery condition, participants 
were instructed to recall a time in which they were in a social situation and felt comfortable, 
calm, and relaxed. For the neutral self-imagery condition, participants were instructed to recall a 
time in which they were completing a solitary activity and felt relaxed. A neutral self-image 
condition was used as an additional control based on previous research (Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, 
Williams, & Morrison, 2006; Ng & Abbott, 2016). If participants were unable to recall a memory 
of a positive, negative, or neutral event, they were prompted to imagine how they would look and 
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feel if a speech had gone well, gone badly, or if they were watching TV alone, respectively. Once 
the memory was brought to mind, participants were instructed to close their eyes and visualize 
this image and report how they felt, appeared, sounded, and how others reacted to them. The 
participants continued to close their eyes and visualize their self-image to elicit a clear self-image 
for each situation. The images that were derived from the negative, positive, and neutral image 
conditions served as the ‘negative image’, ‘positive image’, and ‘neutral image’, respectively. 
Participants were told to keep the self-image in their mind while completing the task. Each 
participant completed all three imagery conditions. The order in which participants completed the 
three imagery conditions was counterbalanced within the anxiety groups. This self-imagery 
manipulation was derived from previous literature evaluating self-imagery and social anxiety 
(e.g., Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hulme et al., 2012; 
Makkar & Gisham, 2011) and has shown to reliably manipulate self-imagery (e.g., Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews, & Williams, 2003; Makkar & Grisham, 2011) with similar valence and vividness 
between social anxiety groups (Makkar & Grisham, 2011). 
Manipulation Check. A self-imagery manipulation check was used based on Ng (2016). 
Similar manipulation checks have been used in previous studies (e.g., Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & 
Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison, 2006; Makkar & Gisham, 
2011); however, Ng (2016) uses the most comprehensive evaluation of self-imagery. As in Ng 
(2016), two sets of manipulation checks were used: one directly after each self-image 
manipulation, and one directly after each Go/No-Go condition. The first manipulation check 
occured directly after the participant elicited a self-image prior to engaging in the Go/No-go task. 
It was comprised of six items that were used to assess various aspects of the self-images such as 
1) accessibility, 2) vividness, 3) averseness, 4) anxiety-provocation, 5) valence 
(positive/negative), and 6) strength of the urge to avoid the image. Participants rated each item on 
an 11-point Likert-type scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“extremely/all the time”).  
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 The second set of manipulation checks occured directly after the completion of the 
Go/No-go task. This manipulation check was comprised of nine-items. The six items from the 
first manipulation check were re-administered, in addition to 1) how much time they were able to 
hold the image in their mind during the task, 2) how much of that image was viewed from the 
observer perspective, and 3) how often the image came to their mind. Participants completed a 
manipulation check directly after the self-image manipulation and after the Go/No-go task for 
each of the three self-image manipulations, thus leading to each participant responding to a total 
of six manipulation checks.  
Go/No-go Task. Each participant completed three Go/No-go tasks; one after each self-
imagery manipulation. The Go/No-go task was based on the paradigm used in Righi, Mecacci and 
Viggiano (2009). Participants were seated 70 cm from a computer monitor, which displayed the 
task. Participants completed a 20-trial practice period with response feedback to ensure they 
understood the task with a proportion of 50% no-go trials. The task consisted of a fixation cross 
“+” for an average of 900 ms (range = 700 – 1100 ms) followed by a digit (i.e., 1, 2 or 3) for 250 
ms (see Figure 1). Participants were tasked with responding as quickly as possible when certain 
stimuli appeared (e.g., 1 or 2; go-trials) by pressing a trigger on a game controller, and to inhibit 
responding when the other stimuli (e.g., 3) appeared (no-go-trials). The meaning (i.e., go or no-
go) of each stimulus was counterbalanced across participants.  After the digit was presented, a 
blank screen was shown for 450 ms per recommendations from Luck (2005) to ensure less error 
in the collection of ERP data. A single trial lasted, on average, 1600 ms.  Each Go/No-go task 
condition consisted of 150 continuous trials (50 of each number; 33% inhibitory trials), leading to 
a total of 450 trials throughout all three self-imagery conditions. Based on research measuring the 
psychometric properties of the N2 and P3, 50 trials per imagery-condition was used for a reliable 
inhibitory response (Clayson & Larson, 2013; Rietdijk, Franken, & Thurik, 2014). Each trial 




 Procedures were approved by the University’s Institutional Review Board. This 
procedure was based on Righi, Mecacci, and Viggiano’s (2009) study. After informed consent, 
participants completed the measures online. After completion of the measures, electrodes were 
attached to measure and record EEG and Electromyography (EMG). The participants completed 
20 practice trials of the Go/No-go task. Next, the participant completed the first self-image 
manipulation and the first set of self-image manipulation checks. Next, the participant completed 
the first Go/No-go task and then the second set of self-image manipulation checks. The self-
image manipulation, manipulation checks, and Go/No-go task procedure occurred two more 
times for a total of three self-image manipulations and three Go/No-go conditions. After 
completion of all three self-imagery conditions, participants were debriefed.  
Physiological Recordings. Electroencephalography (EEG) data were collected using 
MP150 hardware from BIOPAC Systems. AcqKnowledge Software was used to record the EEG 
activity. EEG data were collected using nine electrode channels (F3, FZ, F4, C3, CZ, C4, P3, PZ, 
P4) at a sampling rate of 250Hz, with a band pass filter of .1 – 35Hz using Electro-Cap 
international Inc. electrode caps. An electrode placed on the right mastoid served as the reference 
for all EEG channels for data collection. Offline, all channels were re-referenced to the average of 
the right and left mastoid (Luck, 2007). EMG (eye-movement) was measured using a silver-
chloride electrode placed on the outer canthus of the left and right eye. In addition, blinks were 
detected using an electrode below the left eye. Electrocardiogram data (EKG) electrodes were 
placed on the participant’s torso using a standard 2-lead configuration (Andreassi, 2007). EKG 
data were analyzed using QRStool which identified heartbeats and computed the mean heart rate, 
heart rate variability, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (Allen, 2002; Allen, Chambers, & Towers, 
2007). 
 EEG data were processed using EEGLAB version 12 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB version 3 (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2010). The data were filtered offline using a 
Butterworth low-pass filter with a half-amplitude cutoff of 30Hz and a 12dB role off. EEG 
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activity related to the stimuli was marked using digital TTL signals generated by the computer 
which presented the stimuli. The stimulus epoched EEG activity was epoched 200 ms before and 
600 ms after the onset of the stimuli (total: 800 ms). The EEG activity within the 200 ms prior to 
stimulus onset was used as a baseline for ERP activity. Based on visual inspection of the data and 
previous research using Go-No/go tasks, the N2 was maximal at the FZ electrode cite and P3 was 
maximal at CZ (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbain, 1999). Additionally, N2 amplitude and 
latency was measured in a window of 240 – 320 ms after stimulus presentation whereas the P3 
amplitude and latency were measured in a window of 320 – 500 ms after stimulus presentation 
based on previous literature (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; Bruin & Wijers, 2002; 
Donkers, van Boxtel, 2004; Eimer, 1993; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, 1999; Nakata, 
Arakawa, Suzuki, & Nakayama, 2016). Artifact rejection was initially completed using ICA to 
correct eye artifacts using automatic routines in ERPLAB. No participant had 25 percent or more 
trials rejected.  
Analytic Strategy. The current study used a mixed method design with a between-
subject factor of social anxiety (HSA, LSA) and within-subjects factors of self-image (positive, 
neutral, negative) and task type (go, no-go) and measured multiple outcomes (go/no-go error 
rates, go/no-go response latency, N2 amplitude, N2 Latency, P3 amplitude, and P3 latency). 
Therefore, the data were analyzed using a series of repeated measures factorial ANOVA’s. 
Mauchley’s test was used to assess sphericity, in which no violations of sphericity were observed. 
When examining pairwise comparisons, the Bonferroni adjustment was used when necessary to 









 Table 1 provides means and standard deviations for each social anxiety (SA) Group 
during each Imagery condition for the manipulation checks. A 2 (SA: High, Low) by 3 (Image: 
Pos, Neg, Neu) MANOVA was conducted for the mental images 1) accessibility, 2) vividness, 3) 
averseness, 4) anxiety-provocation, 5) valence 6) strength of the urge to avoid, 7) frequency of 
task-irrelevant thoughts, 8) ability to hold image in mind, and 9) valence of image during the task. 
There was a significant omnibus test for Imagery Condition, F(18,29) = 11.388, p < .001, η2 = 
.876, and a marginal effect for SA Group, F(9,38) = 2.010, p = .065, η2 = .322. There was no 
significant omnibus interaction, F(18,29) = 1.400, p = .204, η2 = .465. Results suggested that the 
linear combination of the dependent variables significantly predicted image condition and 
marginally predicted SA group. Follow up analysis with Bonferroni corrections was used to 
determine which manipulation checks produced significant main effects. Only significant results 
are reported. 
Results of the follow up analysis revealed a main effect of image for the accessibility of 
the mental images F(2,92) = 6.003, p = .004, η2 = .115. Interpretation of simple effects indicates 
that the positive image (M = 8.332) was easier to access than the negative image (M = 7.123). 
There was a main effect of image for the averseness of the self-image, F(2,92) = 7.027, p = .001,
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η2 = .133, in which the negative image (M = 5.055) was more aversive than the neutral 
(M = 3.812) and positive (M = 3.602). Results indicated a main effect for image on anxiety level, 
F(2,92) = 92.615, p < .001, η2 = .668, suggesting that the negative image (M = 6.049) created 
more anxiety than the neutral (M = 1.246) and positive (M = 1.517). There also was a main effect 
of social anxiety on anxiety level, F(1,46) = 8.613, p = .005, η2 = .158, indicating that the high 
social anxiety group (M= 3.613) had more anxiety compared to the low social anxiety (M = 
2.261) group across all image conditions. There was a main effect of image for the urge to avoid, 
F(2,92) = 25.503, p < .001, η2 = .357, suggesting that the negative image (M = 4.761) showed a 
stronger urge to avoid than the neutral (M = 2.108) and positive image (M = 1.693). Results 
indicated a main effect of image for valence, F(2,92) = 33.391, p < .001, η2 = .421, suggesting 
that the negative image (M = 5.780) was more negative than the neutral (M = 3.434) and positive 
image (M = 1.843). Additionally, the neutral image was more negative than the positive. There 
was a main effect of image for the valence of the image that was held during the computer task, 
F(2,92) = 30.785, p < .001, η2 = .401, indicating that the negative image (M = 5.737) was more 
negative than the positive (M = 2.243) and neutral (M = 3.729). Additionally, the positive image 
was more positive than the neutral.  
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Tests of Main Effects  
 High SA 
Group 
M(SD) 
   Low SA 
Group 
M(SD) 








 Negative Positive Neutral  Negative Positive Neutral   
Accessibility 7.68(2.13) 8.36(2.01) 7.00(2.64)  6.56(2.71) 8.30(1.57) 8.34(1.82) 0.01(.904) 6.00(.004) 
Vividness 7.36(2.23) 7.72(2.13) 6.92(2.62)  7.13(2.43) 7.95(1.77) 8.13(1.79) 0.62(.432) 1.67(.193) 
Averseness 5.24(2.36) 4.16(3.41) 4.32(3.14)  4.86(2.86) 3.04(3.02) 3.30(3.03) 1.35(.250) 7.02(.003) 
Anxiety 6.88(2.22) 2.12(2.87) 1.84(2.01)  5.21(2.95) 0.91(1.62) 0.65(1.22) 8.61(.005) 92.61(< 
.001) 









3.20(2.72) 2.84(2.73) 3.52(3.07)  2.86(2.39) 3.65(3.14) 3.69(2.91) 0.10(.750) 1.09(.340) 
Ability to 
Hold Image 









In addition, heart rate (HR), heart rate variability, and respiratory sinus arrhythmia were 
analyzed using a 2 (SA: high, low) x 4 (Image: baseline, pos, neg, neu) mixed-model factorial 
ANOVA to determine if the manipulation influenced physiological arousal. Due to electrodes 
falling off and high levels of noise, 3 individuals from the low and 4 from the high group were 
excluded from these analyses.  Results of the HR analysis found a main effect of Image, F (3,117) 
= 3.981, p = .010, η2 = .093. Follow up analyses indicate that the negative image (M = 78.074) 
resulted in a quicker heart rate than the baseline condition (M = 76.020, t(40) = 3.179, p = .017). 
Results also revealed an interaction, F(3,117) = 4.222, p = .007, η2 = .098, such that there were 
no differences within the low social anxiety group; however, within the high social anxiety group 
the baseline (M = 75.171) had a lower heart rate than the negative (M = 79.311, t(40) = 4.589, p < 
.000) , the neutral (M = 78.281, t(40) = 3.025, p = .004), and the positive condition (M = 78.290, t 
(40) = 3.262, p = .002). Results for HRV and RSA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions.   
Behavioral Data (Error Rates and Response Latency) 
 To assess whether the self-imagery manipulation or social anxiety influenced the 
performance of the Go/No-go task, a 2 (SA: high, low) x 3 (Image: pos, neg, neu) x 2 (Task: go, 
no-go) mixed-model factorial ANOVA was used for error rates and a 2 (SA: high, low) x 3 
(Image: pos, neg, neu) mixed-model factorial ANOVA response latency for correct go trials. For 
sake of brevity, only significant effects are reported. One participant was excluded from the 
behavioral data analysis as they produced 100% error rates, suggesting they did not complete the 
task correctly.  
 Error rate results showed a main effect of task, F(1,45) = 73.118, p < .000, η2 = .619. 
These results suggest that the no-go trials (M = 3.491; i.e., errors of commission) had more errors 
than the go trials (M = .731; i.e., errors of omission). Moreover, there were no significant 
interactions; however, there was a marginal interaction between image and task, F(2,90) = 3.102, 
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p = .050, η2 = .064. Follow up analysis indicated that within the go-trials there were no 
differences between image conditions, but there was a difference between the Negative (M = 
4.10) and Neutral (M = 3.14; t(69) = 2.15, p = .034) and Negative and Positive (M = 3.21; t(69) = 
2.15, p = .014) conditions within the no/go-trials. 
 As for reaction time, results revealed a main effect of social anxiety, F(1,43) = 10.313, p 
= .003, η2 = .193, indicating that the high social anxiety group (M = 401.152 ms) had a longer 
reaction time than the low social anxiety group (M = 363.044 ms). No other main effect or 
interaction was significant.  
ERP amplitude (N2 and P3) 
To assess whether the self-image manipulation or social anxiety influences neural data, 
multiple 2 (Task: go, no-go) x 2 (SA: high, low) x 3 (Image: pos, neg, neu) mixed-model factorial 
ANOVA’s were used for each ERP’s amplitude at the main electrode sites (N2 at FZ, and P3 at 
CZ). Only correct trials (i.e., correct go-trials and correct no/go-trials) were used due to the low 
frequency of error trials. Seven participants were list-wise excluded from the EEG analysis due to 
extreme scores (i.e., Z-scores > 3.29; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), leaving 18 in the low and 24 
in the high group. 
 Results of the N2 revealed no main effects or interactions. Results of the P3 revealed a 
significant main effect of task, F(1,40) = 28.940,  p < .000, η2 = .420, suggesting that no/go trials 
resulted in a larger P3 (M = 7.497) than the go-trials (M = 3.606). Results also revealed a main 
effect of social anxiety, F (1,40) = 5.177,  p = .028, η2 = .115, suggesting that the low social 
anxiety group had a larger P3 (M = 7.108) than the high group (M = 3.996; see Appendix C). No 
other main effects or interactions were significant. 
ERP Latency (N2 and P3) 
To assess whether the self-image manipulation or social anxiety influences the latency of 
the ERP’s, multiple 2 (Task: go, no-go) x 2 (SA: high, low) x 3 (Image: pos, neg, neu) mixed-
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model factorial ANOVA’s were used. Only correct trials (i.e., correct go-trials and correct no/go-
trials) were used due to the low frequency of error trials. 
Results of the N2 latency revealed no main effects or interactions. Results of the P3 
latency revealed a main effect of social anxiety, F(1,25) = 5.177,  p = .008, η2 = .248, suggesting 
that high social anxiety group had a later peak P3 (M = 403.792) than the low group (M = 








The current study aimed to investigate how manipulations in cognitive load and threat 
focus influences effectiveness and efficiency within social anxiety. To explore this relationship, 
participants both high and low in social anxiety completed three self-imagery manipulations and 
three Go-No/go tasks. Based on predications from the attentional control theory, it was 
hypothesized that individuals with high social anxiety would show similar effectiveness (i.e., 
accuracy) as those in the low social anxiety group. Additionally, it was hypothesized that 
individuals with high social anxiety would show hindered efficiency in the Go/No-go task 
displayed by 1) longer inhibition response latencies to the to-be-inhibited stimuli, and 2) 
enhanced levels of neural activity (N2, P3) to inhibit a response. It also was hypothesized that 
manipulating self-imagery would differentially load working memory and present increased 
deficits for those with high social anxiety.  
Results of the manipulation check suggest that those with high social anxiety were more 
anxious, in general, as a result of describing their self-images. These results were supported by 
heart rate data, which indicated that that the individual with high levels of social anxiety showed 
increased HR compared to the baseline, which was not seen in the low anxious group. 
Additionally, the negative self-image manipulation was indeed more aversive, negative, anxiety 
provoking, and held a greater urge to avoid. The negative self-image also remained more 
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negative than the other conditions through the Go-No/go task. These results suggest that 
the negative self-image manipulation increased anxiety and was more negative than the other 
conditions as expected; however, the manipulation did not appear to differentially impact those 
with low and high levels of social anxiety. This is contrary to similar research on self-imagery 
within social anxiety. For example, Hirsch and colleagues (2003) found that negative self-
imagery often resulted in increased anxiety for those with social anxiety. It is possible that the 
negative imagery manipulation did not induce expected levels of anxiety or were not specific to 
enough to idiographic social anxiety. Specifically, the negative imagery manipulation may not 
have resulted in the typical level of anxiety experienced within social situations. Moreover, based 
on physiological data, it appeared that individuals with social anxiety had increased arousal when 
engaging in all three manipulations. These results are contradictory to research suggesting that the 
negative self-image leads to increased deficits (e.g., Brozovich & Heimberg, 2013; Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews, & Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Makkar & Grisham, 2011); 
however, are consistent with research suggesting increased anxiety associated with self-focused 
attention broadly (e.g., Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013; Woody & 
Rodriguez, 2000). Specifically, self-focused attention, in and of itself, increases anxiety, thus, it is 
possible that all image conditions led to increased self-focused attention and increased anxiety. 
As predicted, results did not find a difference between high and low social anxiety for 
error rates, suggesting that, within this task, social anxiety does not impact task performance. 
These results are consistent with inhibitory research and the attentional control theory, which 
suggest that social anxiety may not show deficits in task effectiveness depending on tasks 
(Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). It is possible that this task did not show direct deficits in 
effectiveness since the task did not involve the threat of social interactions, which are often areas 
where deficits in efficiency occur for those with social anxiety (Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & 
Williams, 2003; Stopa & Jenkins, 2007). As expected and consistent with previous Go/No-go 
paradigms, a main effect of task was revealed, such that the inhibition trials resulted in more 
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errors (i.e., errors of commission) than go trials (i.e., errors of omission). Additionally, results 
revealed a significant interaction between task and self-image type, such that the negative image 
condition produced more errors than the positive and neutral within the no-go trials but not in the 
go trials. It is possible that negative images additionally loaded working memory in the inhibition 
trials, thus leading to decreased ability to inhibit a response. This is consistent with previous 
research, indicating that negative self-images result in increased deficits in performance 
(Vassilopoulos & Moberly, 2013). Interestingly, this effect was not specific to social anxiety.  
Conversely, efficiency results suggested that the social anxiety group was slower to 
respond behaviorally and showed decreased neural recruitment in the P3 and a later P3 amplitude. 
These results support the attention control theory (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011), such that social 
anxiety may not show deficits in effectiveness, but often show deficits in efficiency. Moreover, 
this is apparent with slower reaction times towards correct responses, indicating potentially 
slower processing and responding. Furthermore, later P3 amplitude may indicate that the group 
high in social anxiety took longer to process the stimuli, which suggests inefficient processing. 
Moreover, anxiety often impacts attentional control (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011), and the high 
socially anxiety group had higher levels of anxiety across all three imagery conditions, implying 
that the higher levels of anxiety the social anxiety group experienced may have impacted neural 
recruitment efficiency. Interestingly, the high social anxiety group showed a lower P3 amplitude 
suggesting either increased efficiency of neural recruitment to complete the task or decreased 
neural recruitment due to distraction or lower cognitive resources. Although possible, the P3 
amplitude results are unlikely a consequence of increased efficiency due to the increased error 
rates and later P3 amplitude presented within social anxiety. It is more likely that individuals with 
social anxiety were experiencing decreased neural resources due to increased anxiety and 
increased self-focused attention broadly. Specifically, Eysenck and Derakshan (2011) posit that 
anxiety reduces available cognitive resources, thus leaving less resources to effectively complete 
other tasks. In this study, the high anxiety that those in the high social anxiety group reported may 
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have loaded working memory and cognitive resources, leaving less to allocate towards the task. 
This likely resulted in decreased and later P3 amplitude as well as slower responses.  
Contrary to hypotheses, there were no interactions with self-imagery manipulation and 
social anxiety. Past research indicates that negative mental images increase anxiety within those 
that have social anxiety (Vassilopoulos & Moberly, 2013; Vassilopoulos, Moberly & Douratsou, 
2012). Moreover, this increased anxiety was hypothesized to further load cognitive resources; 
however, the current study did not find this effect. It is possible that self-imagery does not impact 
social anxiety as theory suggests, but these results may have been influence by a number of 
factors. For example, the effects shown in social anxiety may be due to increased self-focused 
attention broadly which spans across all three image conditions, thus not resulting in differential 
deficits. Additionally, anxiety regarding the self-images was primarily based on self-report and 
assumption of participant engagement in the task. It is possible that certain participants avoided 
anxiety provoking mental images, as cognitive avoidance is often a strategy within anxiety 
disorders (Akbari & Khanipour, 2018; Borkovec et al., 2004; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 
2010). Furthermore, it is possible that the imagery manipulations did not tap into the anxiety 
often elicited by true social situations, thereby not resulting in differential increases in anxiety. 
Finally, recent research suggests that negative imagery may influence individuals with and 
without anxiety in a similar way, resulting in the sometimes contradictory findings with imagery 
manipulations (Ng & Abbott, 2014; Ng & Abbott, 2016; Ng, Abbott, & Hunt, 2014). 
This study is not without limitations. The current study used a convenience sample of 
college students, which is often a more homogeneous sample then the general population 
(Fabrigar et al., 1999). As discussed above, manipulation checks were used to help ensure that 
participants fully engaged in the manipulation; however, it is possible that participants simply 
failed to fully comply. Additionally, on the scale from 0 to 10, the negative self-images only 
received an average averseness rating of 4-5, valence rating of 5-6, and anxiousness rating of 5-6. 
It is clear that the negative imagery condition did not induce anxiety above minimal to moderate 
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levels. Finally, the amplitude of the P3 may be conflated by the latency of the P3 (Luck, 2007). 
Specifically, the lower amplitude for the social anxiety group may be influenced by trials where 
the peak amplitude occurs outside of the measurement window, thus reducing the trials that show 
the peak amplitude of the P3. Additionally, no significant results were found with the N2. It is 
possible that the Go/No-go task had a larger influence on the P3 or that there was a large amount 
of noise within the waveform, thus only leading to effects for the largest ERP. Future 
investigations should use more individualistic and effective manipulations of self-imagery that 
lead to anxiety levels closer to that experienced in social situations.  
 In conclusion, this study aimed to determine whether the relationship between social 
anxiety and both efficiency and effectiveness was influenced by self-imagery manipulations. 
Consistent with the attentional control theory (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011), those with social 
anxiety showed no deficits in effectiveness but did show broad deficits in efficiency. No 
interactions were seen with self-imagery manipulations, suggesting that the influence of different 
self-images may equally load cognitive resources within social anxiety. Moreover, it is possible 
that the effects of self-imagery are task specific. Generally, these results support the assertion that 
individuals with social anxiety may show ineffective processing and completion of tasks; 
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the statement is 
characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me  3 = Very characteristic or true of me  
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me  4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me  
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me  
 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority    
(teacher, boss, etc.)  
2. I have difficulty making eye-contact with others.  
3. I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my 
feelings.  
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work  
with.  
5. I find it easy to make friends of my own age.  
6. I tense - up if I meet an acquaintance on the street. 
7. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 
9. I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 
10. I have difficulty talking with other people. 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk about. 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 
14. I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the  
opposite sex. 
15. I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in  
social situations. 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be  
ignored. 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 
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